From Mexico’s Cuba ties to Washington's persistent tariff pledges, points of friction keep coming up between Mexico and the United States, reaching a crescendo last month when the U.S. Department of Justice indicted 10 Mexican officials, including a sitting governor from President Claudia Sheinbaum’s own party. "U.S.-Mexican relations are probably in their worst moment that I can remember since the 1970s,” the former foreign minister of Mexico Jorge Castañeda tells AS/COA's Carin Zissis. “Never were there so many fronts open at the same time." In this episode, Dr. Castañeda, a long-time Latin America expert and author of more than 15 books on foreign affairs, breaks down not only what's at stake for bilateral ties, but covers Mexico's relationship with Cuba and the U.S. policy approach to the island.
From Mexico’s Cuba ties to Washington's persistent tariff pledges, points of friction keep coming up between Mexico and the United States, reaching a crescendo last month when the U.S. Department of Justice indicted 10 Mexican officials, including a sitting governor from President Claudia Sheinbaum’s own party.
"U.S.-Mexican relations are probably in their worst moment that I can remember since the 1970s,” the former Foreign Minister of Mexico Jorge Castañeda tells AS/COA's Carin Zissis. “Never were there so many fronts open at the same time."
In this episode, Dr. Castañeda, a long-time Latin America expert and author of more than 15 books on foreign affairs, breaks down not only what's at stake for bilateral ties, but covers Mexico's relationship with Cuba and the U.S. policy approach to the island.
This episode was produced by Executive Producer Luisa Leme. Carin Zissis is your host.
If you enjoyed this episode, write us a review and subscribe on your podcast platform of choice. Send us feedback: latamfocus@as-coa.org
The music in the podcast is “Candombe Jam 1,” by Carlos Quintana, performed for Americas Society. Find out about upcoming concerts at musicoftheamericas.org. Share your love for Latin America: Join Americas Society. https://www.as-coa.org/memberships/engage-americas-society
Transcript
[MUSIC]
Carin Zissis: Hi, I'm Carin Zissis of AS/COA Online. Since early in the second Trump administration, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum drew international praise for keeping a cool head in the face of White House demands, and having an ability to turn that pressure into praise.
[CLIP of Trump: "Oh, and I like Mexico, and by the way, I think the new president is a terrific person, a fantastic woman. We've had many conversations. She's a very elegant, just a fantastic person."]
Zissis: Along the way, the two leaders have navigated tense moments over issues like trade, immigration, and security. But lately, the U.S. pressure campaign on Mexico has mounted.
[CLIP of Trump: "The cartels are running Mexico. We can't have that. Too close to us. Too close to you. We have to eradicate them. We have to knock the hell out of them because they're getting worse. They're taking over their country."]
Zissis: From Mexico's Cuba ties to Washington's persistent pledges of tariffs, points of friction keep coming up, reaching a crescendo last month when the U.S. Department of Justice indicted ten Mexican officials, including a sitting governor from Sheinbaum's own Morena party. And while Mexico may have handed over dozens of wanted criminals to the U.S. over the past year, Sheinbaum's government has been reluctant to extradite one of its own.
Zissis: The president instead doubled down on emphasizing her country's sovereignty as tensions grow.
[CLIP of Sheinbaum (in Spanish): "Aquí no mandan intereses extranjeros ni grupos de poder económico. México es una nación libre, independiente y soberana."]
Zissis: All of this is happening as the two countries ready for the review of the USMCA trade deal and prep for the countdown to a North American World Cup kickoff. Without a doubt, a whole lot is at stake.
So for this episode, we turn to an experienced voice on the U.S.–Mexico relationship to break down this critical moment: former Foreign Minister of Mexico, Jorge Castañeda. And he gave a pretty severe diagnosis.
[CLIP of Castañeda: "U.S.–Mexican relations are probably at the worst moment that I can remember since the 1970s."]
Zissis: But he also shared ideas for a cure.
[CLIP of Castañeda: "What we are doing is responding to what Trump says, whether it's USMCA, Rocha Moya, oil to Cuba, whatever — we are responding. So perhaps one thing that would be interesting or important for the Mexican government to do is to really try and figure out what is our agenda. Not how we respond to Trump's agenda, but what is ours."]
Zissis: In this far-reaching episode of Latin America in Focus, we hear from an expert not only on Mexico, but on Cuba and Latin America as a whole. Dr. Castañeda and I talk about what might happen next in Havana, the state of the left in the region, and why Mexico should not place bets on the Trump administration being more constrained after the U.S. midterms.
[MUSIC]
Zissis: Thank you for joining us. Whether you're listening in Monterrey, Madrid, or Malmö, don't forget to subscribe to and share Latin America in Focus on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.
[SHOW INTRO — Latin America in Focus Podcast]
[Voice over: You're listening to Latin America in Focus. / Latinoamérica en foco. / América Latina em foco. / A podcast by Americas Society/Council of the Americas on politics, economics, and culture in the region.]
[MUSIC]
Carin Zissis: Thank you so much, Dr. Castañeda, for being with us today on Latin America in Focus. It's so great to have you with us.
Jorge Castañeda: It's great to be with you, Carin. Very glad to be here.
Zissis: Just to start off, many are saying that bilateral relations have never been so fragile, and we really could go through a laundry list of contributing factors. To mention a few: the big one is the indictment of Rubén Rocha Moya, the governor of Sinaloa and a stalwart of Mexico's governing Morena party, along with nine other officials. The DEA has promised more indictments are coming of Morena officials. The State Department is reviewing Mexico's 53 consulates in the U.S. and may shut some of them down. Mexico is crying sovereignty over CIA actions in Mexico, and all of it is happening as the USMCA trade deal is coming up for review, and the U.S. ambassador has warned Mexico that the prosecution of corrupt officials is a condition of the deal. Then we have the North American World Cup and eyebrows raising over the Iranian team using Tijuana as a base. And I am sure I have left things off this list. But as we find ourselves in this delicate position, what would you advise President Sheinbaum to do in terms of navigating these complex waters with the United States?
Castañeda: Well, the first thing, Carin, is I think you're right — and the term you used, 'fragile,' is a tiny little bit of a euphemism. U.S.–Mexican relations are probably at the worst moment that I can remember since the 1970s. There may have been other moments before that. During the 1980s, we had the whole Camarena affair in Central America, which was a huge bone of contention at the time, but things never got really out of control, and never were there so many fronts open at the same time. Perhaps that's the biggest difference with all the previous occasions that we've gone through.
Castañeda: And as you say, there are all the ones you mentioned, there are a couple more. The water situation on the river particularly — the Río Bravo as we call it, the Rio Grande as you call it. And there are more instances of more people who will be indicted, more banks that will probably be accused of some sort of money laundering or worse. Plus, complications — to put it mildly — in the relationship with Cuba. Mexico's relationship with Cuba that a lot of people in the United States are objecting to. So we could go on and on. First point: it is really bad. Whenever anybody says there's no problem, things are going well, Donald Trump says he loves Claudia Sheinbaum and she was a ballet dancer and she has a nice voice — all of that is nonsense, quite honestly.
Castañeda: Second point: what to do about it. I think there is not much to do about it because all of this is largely President Trump's doing. Now, of course, you can agree with the way President Trump deals with international affairs or not. But it is largely: He is the one who is driving the agenda. Mexico, for practical purposes, has no agenda. What we are doing is responding to what Trump says, whether it's USMCA, Rocha Moya, oil to Cuba, whatever — we are responding. So perhaps one thing that would be interesting or important for the Mexican government to do is to really try and figure out what is our agenda. Not how we respond to Trump's agenda, but what is ours. That's the first point.
Castañeda: A second one, which as a general rule has been useful through history, is to avoid unnecessary irritants or annoyances. Certain substantive points that are impossible to just dismiss or neglect — USMCA is a typical one. But there are things that are totally unnecessary. Sending humanitarian aid to Cuba is unnecessary. Poking your finger at DHS's eyes is unnecessary, with all this sovereignty question and not handing over Rocha Moya. It's not only unnecessary, but it's obviously very annoying to Secretary Mullen, who came here a couple days ago or sometime last week. There are some issues that are substantive, that you can't really just set aside, but there are a lot of minor annoyances, minor irritants, that Mexico should avoid.
Castañeda: And a third one, which is obviously a matter of discussion, is that in spite of having had several phone calls with President Trump, Claudia Sheinbaum and President Trump have not sat down for a face-to-face substantive meeting on their own. That hasn't happened. And although I do not have the honor of having ever met President Trump, I am told — or I have read — that these personal relationships are very important to him. I don't think you can manage that on the phone, no matter how cordial the phone calls are. And no matter how many of them there are.
Zissis: And there have been many, there have been about 20 or so, as I understand, or close to it.
Castañeda: Exactly.
Zissis: We’re going to talk about Cuba a little bit later, because I do want to follow up on that. But, you mentioned irritants, and it makes me think of a comment that a Mexican analyst made to me last year — it was in the context of the USMCA negotiation about North America and Canada, and how each of the countries were handling the relationship with Trump. And at the time, he made the point that Mexico was conceding quite a lot to Trump, and Canada wasn't, and it was kind of like maybe that works fine for Mexico — maybe they're thinking about the short game, Canada playing the long game. But with some of the irritants you're mentioning, is Claudia Sheinbaum switching tack? She's holding a rally on May 31st to celebrate two years since her electoral victory, and as part of that she said it will be about Mexican sovereignty. As you mentioned, she has not handed over Rocha Moya and these other indicted officials. Members of her party are talking about introducing legislation to combat foreign influence in elections. There are lot of things that seem to be these irritants. Is she switching tack, do you think?
Castañeda: No, I don't think so, though I'm not sure obviously. My sense is — and as the analyst you quoted said, and I agree with that — she has basically given in to Trump on every item on the agenda. Every single one, ranging from tariffs on Chinese imports, to no oil for Cuba, including sending 92 drug kingpins from Mexico to the U.S. without extradition procedures, and essentially illegally. She has given in on everything except the so-called 'boots on the ground' that Trump has theoretically suggested — we don't know this as a fact, we know much more what she says that he said; all he says is 'I have offered help.' But let's suppose it's true. She has not caved in on that. Maybe a little bit of a strawman, there may be some truth to it. But everything else she has caved to.
And by the way, ‘no boots on the ground’ I don’t know what kind of shoes the four CIA agents in Chihuahua were wearing. I don’t image they were wearing sandals. In the Sierra Tarahumara they were probably wearing boots. So, there are all kinds of boots…
Castañeda: I think what she's doing now is, because she knows that she has given in on everything, she probably wants to stiffen up the rhetoric and the symbolic gestures that play to her base — and that's a logical thing to do. The problem with that is that in the modern world, with social media, with the amount of foreign correspondents in Mexico, with the closeness of the two countries, people in the States notice the stuff that she does for her local base. You can't have two different discourses, one for the U.S. and one for Mexico, and the Americans will never find out because they don't read Spanish. That doesn't work anymore. Whatever she says or does — almost immediately, there's a response in the U.S., whether it's the executive branch, the Congress, the media, the think tanks, or the lobbyist groups. But there is a response every day she says something.
Castañeda: For example, her legal counsel, who is also kind of a spokesperson for her in her morning press conferences, said two or three days ago: 'The problem with security with the United States and drug trafficking and organized crime is that Americans are all a bunch of drug addicts. So, you know, there's not really much we can do.' I don't know if that's necessary, and I'm not sure it helps a whole lot. Now, it plays very well in Mexico — Mexicans love that stuff. But there's no way somebody in the U.S. didn't hear it.
Zissis: You made this reference to a question we hear over and over: are we going to see U.S. military action in Mexico, or as you put it, boots on the ground? You referenced the CIA case in Chihuahua, where it came to light that there were CIA agents in an operation to bust a drug lab. And then there has been alleged CIA involvement in an action against narcos just outside of Mexico City, involving the bombing of a car recently. So, are we seeing signs of boots on the ground already?
Castañeda: I tend to think so, as I said. These are not U.S. DOD people, not troops, not the Marines. But if they're wearing boots, if they're in uniform, they're carrying weapons, and they participate in extrajudicial executions in Mexico — that sounds pretty much like boots on the ground. Now, these were exceptional, first of all, secondly, these were clearly clandestine and were not meant to be known about, but they were. And the more guys you have here, and the more activities they carry out of this nature, the more leaks or accidents or information there will be.
Castañeda: The bomb that was apparently leaked to CNN seems to me to be something the Americans leaked — not the Mexicans. These things are real. Exactly how far away from the lab in Chihuahua the four CIA agents were, we don't know — but does it matter a whole lot? Were they just walking behind the Mexicans? And, by the way, why were they there? Well, It's obvious: they were there to ensure that the Mexicans, whom they had given the information about where the lab was, actually went in and took it. And there was not a single arrest, because obviously the guys running the lab were tipped off.
Zissis: There's a question of who knows what. It seems as though it's a bad reflection if there's confusion about whether the Sheinbaum government is aware of this or not.
Castañeda: It’s very difficult to figure that one out. It would seem strange to me that the Mexican army, the military, would not be aware of these two cases that we know about. And if there was a closer-to-the-ground involvement by U.S. personnel in the capture and execution of El Mencho in Tapalpa, now three or four months ago, all of that seems very difficult for me to believe the military did not know about it. Now, do the Mexican military inform the civilian leadership — García Harfuch? I have no idea. Do they inform the president? I have no idea. Do they not inform her because she asked them not to — which would be, in many ways, a wise thing to do: 'Look, I don't want to know. Do whatever you guys need to do, with whoever you need to do it with, but just keep me out of it.' That would not be illogical at all, and that happens in every country in the world, beginning with the United States.
Zissis: To stay on the bilateral relationship — you recently wrote a column arguing that while many think Mexico will be an important issue in the U.S. midterms, it will not be Trump's perennial piñata, as many assume. Why not?
Castañeda: First of all, because from what I read in the polls, the only issue that really is important and involves Mexico is immigration. But it is viewed much more in the U.S. as a domestic issue — whether ICE is acting in a way that you agree with or not, it’s gone too far or not, whether the border is sufficiently shut down or not, et cetera. It doesn't seem to me, from what I see in U.S. polls, that relations with Mexico, or corruption in Mexico, or drugs in Mexico, are an important issue in Americans' concerns leading up to the elections. This idea that is very widespread in Mexico — beginning with President Sheinbaum herself — that all of this is American electioneering, pandering to the MAGA base for reasons that only have to do with the midterm elections: I think she's misreading the U.S. situation.
Zissis: You've also said, however, that she's betting on Republican losses in the U.S. midterms as a way to temper Trump's hostilities toward Mexico. You said think that's the wrong bet on her part. Why?
Castañeda: Because, traditionally, lame-duck presidents after midterms tend to concentrate on foreign policy precisely because they've lost the capability of doing a whole lot domestically. The U.S. president has a lot of leeway in doing things in foreign affairs without Congress, and Trump particularly has more leeway because he doesn't care about Congress and does whatever he wants — rightly or wrongly, and the Republicans let him get away with it. The fact is this is a traditional pattern in U.S. history, and we've seen it recently and long ago. So, the logical thing would be for Trump, once he does take a shellacking (as Obama used to say) in November, to abandon much of his domestic agenda, because he won’t be able to get it done, and concentrate on foreign affairs — which, by the way, he's doing anyway already. It’s not that this will start in November. This idea that he will be constrained by Congress and the Senate even if the Republicans lose the Senate — I think that's just not a proper reading of the history of American lame-duck presidencies, after losing midterms.
Zissis: On that foreign policy front — we've obviously seen a lot of activity in Latin America, particularly Venezuela at the beginning of the year. But Cuba, which I'd love to hear your perspective on as a Cuba expert: watching events there in recent weeks, from Washington's oil blockade, to the head of the CIA visiting Havana, to the indictment of Raúl Castro — do you care to make a prediction of what's going on there and what could happen?
Castañeda: Look, I would not like to, because so many analysts have lost their shirts betting on an end to the Cuban regime over the last 50-plus years that I don't have enough shirts to lose. So I'd rather be careful on that one. I think the issue is, Carin, that the administration doesn't really know what to do, because none of its options are particularly attractive. Sending in troops — boots on the ground in Cuba — does not look like a great idea. Americans and the MAGA base aren't particularly happy with the war in Iran. It's difficult to think that there would be no casualties in Cuba. It's much closer by [the U.S.]. And the Cubans are a much more homogeneous, compact, disciplined group of people than the Venezuelans were.
Castañeda: Secondly: to do what? Set up a new government — with whom? They're looking for a Delcy Rodríguez-type figure and haven't found her or him. If they had found one we would probably know about it by now. But, my impression is that it's not easy to find somebody like that in the Cuban nomenclature, or the Cuban leadership because they are very united and cohesive. They go back 67 years together, literally. So, you have that second point: who is it?
And thirdly: what happens then? Are you going to negotiate for economic reforms but not political reforms? Or allow elections right away?
Castañeda: That is if they don't go in, then what are the options? Just keep squeezing? There is a humanitarian crisis in Cuba, and it's not clear that squeezing will force them to cave — as we've seen with the Iranians, squeezing and bombing and everything else they’ve done do not seem to have worked so far. I’m not sure it would work in Cuba either. And then the final option may be some sort of extraction operation with Raúl Castro, like with Maduro. Obviously, I don’t know this. But knowing the Cubans from well over 45 years, my sense is there is a guy standing next to Raúl Castro 24 hours a day, and if the Americans are coming, they will do what is necessary to ensure that they do not take him alive back to the United States. I have no doubt about that whatsoever.
Zissis: To get back to the Mexico connection on this — you referenced the issue of Mexico initially sending oil, and the stress caused by that, then sending humanitarian aid to Cuba. Mexico has historically had a special relationship with Cuba, but beyond that, many in Morena are the kind of old-school leftists aligned with Cuba. So if we do see the regime fall in Cuba, it would be the end of an era. What does that mean for the Mexican left if the regime in Cuba were finally to be gone?
Castañeda: It would be a major tragedy — emotionally, politically, ideologically. The Mexican left is still a very retrograde left. Not like, say, the Chilean left or the Uruguayan left. Chile began voting against human rights violations in Cuba at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva 25 years ago, including with the support of Salvador Allende's widow. The Uruguayans the same. The Mexican left is very retrograde — they are troglodytes, basically — and they’re profound admirers of the Cuban revolution. Starting with President Sheinbaum herself. I know her. She was a student of mine 35 years ago. And that’s who she is. I think it's a terribly anachronistic, authoritarian, and very criticizable position, but that's what it is. So, for them it would be very serious. For all of them it would be a big, big problem.
Castañeda: And that's why we're referring again to irritants: she got up five or six days ago to say, 'Why are they indicting Raúl Castro? This happened 30 years ago.' Well, why is that necessary? Why can't she just say, 'I have nothing to comment about that,' or, 'This is something between the United States and Cuba, I don't have the facts'? But there she goes. She just can't be quiet about it. Although on the real substance — the oil — she caved immediately. Cubans don't need humanitarian diapers; there are no babies in Cuba anymore, they've all left. They need oil. And she can't give them oil, which is understandable.
Zissis: Is she also speaking to her base when she says that?
Castañeda: Absolutely. That's who she's speaking to. Except that it appears in the American media a couple of hours later, or in American social media five minutes later. And you have enough people in the U.S. Congress, more in the house than in the Senate — Senator Cruz from Texas, the three Cuban American House members from Miami — for whom this stuff is very important. Americans at large, I don't think care one way or another if Mexico sends oil to Cuba or not. But there are individuals who do, and they are monitoring this very closely.
Zissis: This issue extends to Latin America overall. One country you could point to and say has aligned itself with Cuba is Lula in Brazil. He's running for president again. Even if he wins another term, he will someday be gone — so we're seeing the end of an era coming in Brazil too. So the potential end of the Cuban regime extends to an end of a certain kind of left all across Latin America. At the same time, we've been seeing a rise of the right. As someone who has written about the left, what do you see as the future for the left in Latin America amid this incredible shift?
Castañeda: Well, in the first place, Carin, I'm not sure how the results will go in Colombia and Brazil. It's possible that both the Workers' Party and the Petro coalition lose, but they may both win. So I'm not sure that we're really seeing, in that sense, an end of an era. And Mexico will continue to have a left-wing or left-center government at least until 2030. These are the three most populous countries in the region.
Castañeda: Secondly, Lula with regard to Cuba is in pretty much the same bind that Sheinbaum is. Brazil is a major oil exporter — exports much more oil than Mexico, almost three times as much — and they haven't sent a drop of oil to Cuba since the Venezuelans and the Russians stopped doing it. He hasn't even tried. Colombia, also an oil exporter, and they haven’t tried. Because they don't want to get into trouble with Trump. They are all very pragmatic in that sense. Lula has a bit the same kind of rhetoric Sheinbaum does, and Petro also defends Raúl Castro. But at the end of the day, they're careful. They're cautious. They don't go around doing crazy things. They say crazy things, but they don't do crazy things.
Castañeda: I think many of the things that made it possible for the so-called pink waves in Latin America — in the early 2000s and then again toward 2018 — what made it possible for them to govern, and in many cases to govern well (certainly in Chile, certainly in Brazil most of the time, certainly in Uruguay), were lessons learned before. But there are a lot of lessons still left to be learned. Corruption continues to plague the left immensely in Latin America — in Mexico in particular, but the Lava Jato scandal was in Brazil and was about Lula's government. Perhaps not about him personally, but it was certainly there. And the lack of consistency on human rights and the defense of democracy — they are terribly inconsistent. They don't like human rights violations in Gaza but they don't mind them in Cuba. Period, full stop.
Castañeda: So I think the left's aggiornamento — which took place in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War and led to them being able to win elections and govern. But I think there's a new aggiornamento that is necessary, that has not begun, which will allow them to be much more consistent, and consequently, to be able to defend themselves more effectively if and when there are U.S. administrations that are hostile. Which is not all the time, by the way. The Clinton and mainly the Obama administrations were not hostile. And not even Bush was — Bush famously got along very well with Lula. Lula went to Camp David. They drove the little golf cart around. But now they do have to go a step further.
Zissis: It also seems as though Lula and Trump have at times, at least on the surface, gotten along quite well, too. We're going to have to get you to come back on in the future, Dr. Castañeda, to talk again as we see new shifts — and inevitably we will. We'll see what the future of the left will be looking like in the region in the coming years. I want to thank you so much for coming on and for spending this time with us today.
Castañeda: Thank you very much for having me, Carin. I enjoyed it very much, and I look forward to doing it again soon.
[MUSIC]
Zissis: Thanks for listening. I'm your host Carin Zissis. This episode was produced by our executive producer, Luisa Leme.
Zissis: You can find other episodes of Latin America in Focus at www.as-coa.org/podcast or write us an email telling us what you think at latamfocus@as-coa.org. Share it, write us a review, and subscribe at Apple, Spotify, YouTube, or wherever you get your podcasts.
[MUSIC]
Zissis: The music in the podcast was performed for Americas Society. Find out about upcoming concerts at musicoftheamericas.org. And consider becoming an Americas Society member for preferential access to all performances at 680 Park Avenue in New York, as well as art exhibitions, book talks, and more exciting events.
[MUSIC]
Zissis: Opinions expressed in this podcast do not necessarily reflect those of Americas Society/Council of the Americas or its members. Thank you.